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In recent literature there has been increasing attention to the thought
that mereological nihilists and near-nihilists like Peter van Inwagen and
Trenton Merricks face a challenge that they cannot adequately meet
(see Bennett 2009, Elder 2011; Tallant 2014; Unger 2014).
The challenge, as it is put most explicitly by Tallant, is that they
need to answer a question logically analogous to the question with
which they confront their opponents, the Special Composition Ques-
tion (SCQ), but that they cannot do so satisfactorily. The Special
Composition Question, roughly expressed for the moment, concerns
the conditions under which parts compose a whole (some whole or
other). The logically analogous question, again roughly expressed for
the moment, is supposed to be: ‘Under what conditions are some
things arranged F-wise, for some or other reading of “F”?’, which Tal-
lant calls ‘the Special Arrangement Question’ (SAQ).1
A discussion complementary to mine is Brenner 2015. But Brenner
does not question the meaningfulness of what he follows Tallant in
calling ‘the Special Arrangement Question’. That this question is
meaningless is the main contention of the first half of this paper.
So I argue that the SAQ is no challenge to the nihilists since they
need not accept that it is meaningful. There are meaningful questions
with which this supposed question might be being confused, they can
allow. However, they can say, these are questions the nihilist can
answer satisfactorily. Indeed, answers are implicit and very nearly
explicit in the work of, in particular, van Inwagen, who of course
introduced the talk of things being arranged F-wise.
In what follows I therefore focus on Tallant’s discussion and his
criticisms of van Inwagen.
First we need an exact statement of the Special Composition Question.
Van Inwagen defines the relation of composition between the xs and
an individual y as follows: the xs compose y if and only if everything
which is one of the xs is a part of y, everything which is a part of y over-
laps one of the xs and no xs overlap.2 Thus the bricks on the building
1 Since I am going to be critical of him, let me stress how interesting Tallant’s thought
is. When he asked the SCQ van Inwagen exposed the common–sense moderate posi-
tion on composition as the can of worms it really is. Tallant’s idea is that there is a
logically structurally corresponding question which does as much damage to the posi-
tion of the mereological nihilist.
2 Note that ‘are parts of y’ is the form of a plural distributive predicate: if the xs are
parts of y each of the xs is part of y.
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site compose 57 Elm Street just in case every brick is a part of 57 Elm
Street, everything which is a part of 57 Elm Street overlaps some brick
and no bricks overlap. This can be expressed in the vocabulary of
first–order predicate logic: for every x, if x is a brick on the site x is a
part of 57 Elm Street and for every y, if y is a part of 57 Elm Street then
for some z, for some u, z is a brick on the site and u is a part of y and u
is a part of z and for every u, for every w, if u is a brick on the site and w
is a brick on the site then it is not the case that there is a v such that v is
a part of u and v is a part of w.3 This definition of composition fixes the
meaning of the two–place open sentence ‘the xs compose y’ and hence
the one–place open sentence ‘for some y, the xs compose y’. So we can
now formulate the SCQ: ‘When is it the case that for some y, the xs com-
pose y?’ That is, under what conditions is the one–place open sentence
‘for some y, the xs compose y’ satisfied? The SCQ is so-called, of course,
by contrast with the General Composition Question (GCQ): under what
conditions is the two–place open sentence ‘the xs compose y’ satisfied?
Van Inwagen’s examination considers answers to the SCQ of the
form: the xs compose something, just in case. . .the xs. . ., in which the
condition given on the xs is formulated without mention of identity
or parthood or using a quantifier the domain of which is more inclu-
sive than the xs. So, for example, he considers Contact, that the xs
compose something just in case they are in contact. His challenge to
common–sense ontology is to answer the question so understood.
The SAQ, as defined by Tallant, is supposed to be analogous to the
SCQ. Whilst remaining neutral about the existence of houses we can
speak of the bricks as being arranged house-wise, van Inwagen thinks.
So Tallant thinks that as he defines it the SAQ is a question the nihi-
lists must answer. The difficulty, however, is that he fails to give the
SAQ a meaningful formulation.
He puts forward three proposals as to what this question is.
The first is that it is the question: when is it true that the xs (the
mereological simples) are arranged F-wise? (2014:1511).
However, this is analogous not to the SCQ, but to the GCQ (‘when
is it true that the xs compose y?’). Moreover, it is meaningful only if
‘F’ is a bindable variable (as ‘y’ is in the GCQ), so that the open sen-
tence ‘the xs are arranged F-wise’ denotes a relation. Whether this is
so is also the chief question about Tallant’s second proposed identifi-
cation of the SAQ.
This is that the SAQ is to be identified with the question: ‘When is
it true that for some xx, the xs are arranged F-wise?’.
Obviously, this is confused; this question is not structurally analo-
gous to the SCQ (When is it true that for some y, the xs compose y?).
3 This is so because the plural description ‘the bricks on the site’ is constructed using a
distributive predicate: if the xs are bricks on the site every one of the xs is a brick on
the site. Plural definite descriptions can be constructed from non–distributive predi-
cates and such descriptions can be used in mereological statements, however, for
example, ‘the planks concealing the Greeks are parts of a wooden horse’.
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The structurally analogous question Tallant intends has to be: ‘When
is it true that for some F, the xs are arranged thing-y-such- that-Fy-
wise?’4 Tallant’s actual formulation uses a plural quantifier which
should not be present, and omits a second–order quantifier which is
required. It is structurally analogous, not to the SCQ, but to the
meaningless question: when is it true that some things compose it?
Now just as it is only because ‘the xs compose y’ is an open sentence
containing the free but bindable plural variable ‘the xs’ and the free
but bindable individual variable ‘y’ and so denotes a relation, that the
SCQ makes sense, so it is only if ‘the xs are arranged thing-y-such-
that-Fy-wise’ is an open sentence which contains the free, but bind-
able, plural variable ‘the xs’ and the free, but bindable, predicate
variable ‘F’ and denotes a relation that the SAQ, as presently
understood, makes sense. In that case we can speak of the xs as being
arranged simpliciter by binding the predicate variable with an existen-
tial quantifier. But we cannot do so if ‘the xs are arranged thing-y-
such-that-Fy-wise’ does not denote a relation. So the SAQ, on this
understanding only makes sense if it does.
But there is no reason to suppose that ‘the xs are arranged thing-y-
such-that-Fy-wise’ does denote a relation. I shall come back to this
crucial point after looking at Tallant’s third proposed identification
of the SAQ.
This is simply that the SAQ is a question already identified by
Bennett. Tallant quotes Bennett as follows.
. . . the nihilist equally needs to say something about what the world
has to be like to contain simples arranged table-wise. If the believer
should tell us when some simples compose a thing of kind F, the
nihilist should tell us when and how some simples are arranged
F-wise’ (Bennett 2009: 66).
But Bennett is not here identifying a single question, structurally
analogous to the SCQ. She is simply pointing out that the nihilist
(and near-nihilist) must provide answers to a whole set of questions.
How must the world be to contain simples arranged table-wise though
there are no tables? How must the world be to contain simples
arranged artefact-wise though there are no artefacts? How must the
world be to contain simples arranged complex-object-wise though
there are no complex objects? These are obviously good questions,
but they are not ones nihilists have been unaware of and, as we shall
see, there are answers to them in van Inwagen’s work which are left
unimpaired by Tallant’s discussion.
4 This mouthful is needed for grammaticality because ‘F’ is a bound predicate variable.
Of course, it is only because we are trying to achieve a meaningful formulation of the
SAQ that we are required to think this. There is, in fact, I think, no need for nihilists
or near-nihilists like van Inwagen to agree.
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So if the supposed SAQ is to have the significance Tallant thinks it
has the crucial question is the one posed three paragraphs back. Does
‘the xs are arranged thing-y-such-that-Fy-wise’ denote a relation?
Van Inwagen takes great care to explain exactly what relation ‘the
xs compose y’ denotes. He makes no attempt to explain what relation
‘the xs are arranged F-wise’ denotes.5 So, given that talk of things
being arranged F-wise is his coinage, there is no reason to think that
it denotes any relation, or therefore to think that the SAQ
makes sense.
Nor does the way in which he introduces the talk of things being
arranged F-wise give any reason to think that it makes sense. As we
shall see in more detail in a moment he does so by reference to the
man in the street’s beliefs. Roughly speaking, he suggests that the xs
are arranged F-wise just in case they occupy a region which is believed
to contain an F by someone who believes that there are Fs, or would
be so believed by such a person if he was aware of the arrangement
of the xs there. This statement ascribes a property to the xs, but it is
not at all obvious and never suggested by van Inwagen that it asserts a
relation to hold between the xs and the property of being an F. If I
say of the Ortcutts that Ralph believes them to be a spy ring, I ascribe
a property to the Ortcutts, but it is highly controversial that I thereby
assert a relation to hold between the Ortcutts and something else,
indicated by the predicate ‘are a spy ring’. Of course, there are analy-
ses on which this is the case. According to an analysis inspired by
Frege, for example (Kaplan 1968) I assert that the Ortcutts stand in a
relation to the sense of the predicate ‘are a spy ring’ which is a con-
stituent of a thought Ralph believes to be true. According to an analy-
sis inspired by Quine (Quine 1977) I assert that the Ortcutts are
related to an open sentence ‘the xs are a spy ring’, which is a con-
stituent of a sentence Ralph believes-true. So if we understand being
arranged F-wise in these terms we can perhaps make sense of the idea
that ‘the xs are arranged F-wise’ denotes a relation, not between the
xs and a property, that is, the (direct) reference of a predicate, but
between the xs and the Fregean sense of the predicate ‘is an F’ or
the predicate itself. But it is clear that all this is far from Van Inwa-
gen’s interests. There is no reason to think that he uses locutions of
the form ‘the xs are arranged F-wise’ to denote a relation at all. Nor
does he need this to be so for his purposes.
Consider also that as well as such locutions van Inwagen will also
allow locutions of the form ‘the xs are arranged a-wise’ in which ‘a’
takes the places of a singular term. So as well as the SAQ, ‘when is it
true for some F, the xs are arranged F-wise?’, there is apparently also
to be considered the question, ‘When is it true that for some y, the xs
are arranged y-wise?’ (we might call this the ‘Special Arrangement as
5 We can now return to this easier form since we are no longer assuming that ‘F’ must
be a bindable predicate variable.
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Individuals Question’, or SAIQ). But, of course, just because van
Inwagen is happy to say that ‘these particles are arranged Everest-
wise’ would be true as uttered by a suitably located speaker making a
suitable ostension, he is not committed to saying that it would be also
true to say in the same context that for some y, these particles are
arranged y-wise, that is, that some individual is such that these parti-
cles are arranged that-individual-wise. He can think that ‘these parti-
cles are arranged Everest-wise’ would express a truth uttered in the
appropriate context without having to accept that in this locution
‘Everest’ occupies the place of a bindable singular individual variable.
So he is not obliged to regard the SAIQ as meaningful. The same is
true, mutatis mutandis of the SAQ. Of course, someone inspired by
Frege might say that ‘these particles are arranged Everest-wise’, under-
stood along the lines van Inwagen suggests, does assert a relation
between the particles and the Fregean sense of ‘Everest’ (and mutatis
mutandis for someone inspired by Quine). But this is a commitment
van Inwagen need not take on.
Van Inwagen is not required to regard the SAQ and the SAIQ as
significant because, for his purposes, he does not need to regard the
forms ‘the xs are arranged F/a-wise’ as denoting relations at all.6
The reason van Inwagen introduces these locutions is to explain
why, despite not believing in tables, chairs, mountains in general,
Mount Everest, in particular, or even the Moon (1990: 105), he is not
a madman. The reason, he thinks, is that he has something in com-
mon with the defender of common sense which the madman who
does not believe that there are tables etc., (because he believes that
his experience of the world is a product of a deceiving demon, or
that he is a brain in a vat, or inhabits the Matrix) does not, namely
the belief that there are particles arranged table-wise. According to
van Inwagen the reason why what he says in his study when he asser-
torically utters the words ‘there are no tables’ or ‘there is no Moon’ is
consistent with what is said by the common–sense man speaking out-
side the ontology room who assertorically utters the sentence ‘there
are six antique tables in the next room’ or ‘there is a Moon’ is that
the common–sense man is speaking in a loose and popular manner,
whereas he is speaking strictly and philosophically. The negative exis-
tential proposition he expresses is not rendered false by the fact that
there are particles arranged table-wise, whereas the proposition the
6 Of course, ‘the xs are arranged a-wise’ does assert a relation, instantiation, between
the xs and the plural non–distributive property of being arranged a-wise, just as ‘the
xs compose a’ asserts that the xs instantiate the plural non–distributive property of
composing a, but van Inwagen is not obliged to think that it asserts any relation other
than instantiation between the xs and any other entity (object or property), so he is
not obliged to think the SAIQ makes sense. Mutatis mutandis, though he must accept
that ‘the xs are arranged F-wise’ does assert a relation, instantiation, between the xs
and the plural non–distributive property of being arranged F-wise he is not obliged to
think the SAQ makes sense.
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ordinary man expresses by the sentence ‘there are six antique tables
in the next room’ is true just in case there are in that region appro-
priately related particles arranged table-wise. Thus the ordinary man’s
belief, as he would express it, that there are tables, is true just in case
there are particles arranged table-wise. But van Inwagen means more
than that when he utters the sentence ‘there are tables’ and the extra
thing this sentence expresses in his mouth, he thinks, is false.
But none of this requires van Inwagen to regard the open sentence
‘the xs are arranged F-wise’ as denoting a relation.
So the Special Arrangement Question and the Special Arrangement
as Individuals Question are not questions van Inwagen is required to
answer, since he is not required for his purposes so much as to regard
them as intelligible,
Van Inwagen’s response to the accusation of madness can be adopted
by nihilists to defend their even sparser ontology. And like van Inwagen
to do so they need not acknowledge that the so-called SAQ and SAIQ
make sense. Tallant’s supposed SAQ is thus a red (or dead) herring.
However, though there is no obligation on the nihilist or near-nihilist
to provide an answer to the SAQ, since they need not acknowledge such
a question, the obligations they do have, which Bennett notes, might
confusedly be identified with this illusory one. And, in fact, the later part
of Tallant’s discussion can be understood as arguing, unconvincingly as
we shall see, that they cannot meet these genuine obligations and cannot
even explain what is meant by ‘the xs are arranged table-wise’.
Van Inwagen thinks that there are no tables, but thinks that he has
something in common with the man in the street who thinks that there
are (i.e., who would assent to the sentence ‘there are tables’ understood
in what van Inwagen would call the loose and popular sense) which the
madman cannot claim to have in common with him, namely, the belief
that there are particles arranged table-wise. So he needs to explain what
this means if it does not mean that there are particles which compose a
table. He also thinks that there are no artefacts composed of particles at
all, but he does not think that even this puts him at odds with the man
in the street. Consequently, he needs to explain what ‘there are things
arranged artefact-wise’ means consistently with his belief that its truth is
not incompatible with his belief that there are no artefacts. And he has
similarly to explain the meaning of ‘there are things arranged inani-
mate-complex-object-wise’ in the sense he thinks this is true. Van Inwa-
gen is very well aware of all this. Of course, the nihilist incurs all these
obligations too, on pain of being grouped with the madman, and in
addition is obliged to explain what he means by ‘there are things
arranged animal/plant/living-thing/complex-object-wise’ in the sense
he thinks these sentences true, given that he thinks that there are no
complex things at all. This is just Bennett’s thought again.
The latter part of Tallant’s discussion, then, is best viewed as argu-
ing that the attempts nihilists and near-nihilists have made to meet
these obligations are inadequate.
6
© 2019 The Authors Analytic Philosophy Published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd
He considers the proposals about the meaning of the form of words
‘there are things arranged F-wise’ from Dorr and Rosen, Merricks and van
Inwagen and argues that none of them are satisfactory. Of these I shall
consider only his criticism of van Inwagen and show that it is unsuccessful.
The starting point of Tallant’s argument is Kripke’s thought that since
there are no unicorns there could not have been, or at least there is no
saying under what circumstances there would have been. This is gener-
alised by Williams (2006), who suggested that a range of terms, including
natural kind terms, have no intension unless they have a non–empty
extension. So, just as there could not have been unicorns since there are
none, if van Inwagen is right there could not have been water molecules
since there are none, and if the nihilist is right there could not have been
dogs or other complex living things since there are none.
Tallant uses these ideas to criticise van Inwagen’s proposed explana-
tion of the form ‘there are things arranged F-wise’ (which Tallant
calls REGIONS).7 van Inwagen (1990: 109):
‘The xs are arranged chair-wise’ is true iff they fill a chair-receptacle
and satisfy certain other conditions.
And (1990: 104-105):
Consider those regions of space that, according to those who
believe in the existence of chairs, are occupied by chairs. Call them
chair-receptacles.
Thus, according to van Inwagen, there are simples arranged table-wise
if there is a table-receptacle, a region believed to contain a table by some-
one who thinks there are tables, which is filled by simples (also satisfying
certain other conditions). There are simples arranged water–molecule-
wise if there is a water-molecule-receptacle, a region believed to contain a
water molecule by someone who thinks that there are water molecules,
which is filled by simples (also satisfying certain other conditions). And
so on. The nihilist can adopt this proposal and explain what ‘there are
things arranged living-thing/complex-thing-wise’ means in terms of the
notion of a living thing/complex thing-receptacle. (This explanation is
analogous to Hume’s second definition of cause, ‘an object followed by
another, and whose appearance always conveys the thought to that
other’. There remains the question what it is about the way particles are
arranged in a region which prompts, or would prompt, a believer in
7 He also uses them to criticise Dorr and Rosen and Merricks, but this part of his dis-
cussion appears merely to repeat the discussion of Dorr in footnote 20 of Williams
(2006) (‘Cian Dorr, in various places, suggests that the truth lying behind an ordinary
assertion of “there are cats” can be expressed as follows: were composition to happen,
but particles to be arranged just as they actually are, then there would be cats. But
for this to be true on a standard theory of counterfactuals, “cats” would have to have
a non–trivial intension’). He goes beyond Williams in his criticism of van Inwagen.
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tables to say that there is a table in that region. This question would have
to be answered by something logically analogous to Hume’s first defini-
tion of cause. But of course, van Inwagen knows this.)
Tallant’s objection is the following:
The structure of this move is, I think as follows. Begin with the con-
cept of a chair. Imagine that there is a thing that corresponds to
the concept. It occupies some space. Whatever space it occupies is
a chair-receptacle.
I think that we should reject REGIONS. Suppose, for instance, that we
wished to say that there is a collection of simples arranged ‘cat-wise’. The
truth-conditions for this sentence will, according to REGIONS, make ref-
erence to the existence of a cat-receptacle. We must understand ‘cat-
receptacle’ in terms of the terms ‘cat’ and ‘receptacle’. But the term
‘cat’ has no intension (if there are no cats). Since REGIONS is stated in
terms of the existence of such receptacles, so it turns out that the nihilist
cannot generalise the strategy described in REGIONS (2014: 1517).
The objection simply ignores van Inwagen’s appeal to the notion of
belief. Granted Kripke’s point about the concept of a unicorn, it does
not follow that one cannot have a belief about unicorns (perhaps
Tallant’s idea is that this follows if ‘unicorn’ has no intension8). In fact,
Kripke does; he believes that there are no unicorns and could not be.9 If
one can have beliefs about unicorns the notion of a unicorn-receptacle,
understood in van Inwagen’s terms, makes perfect sense, and hence so
does the statement ‘there are simples arranged unicorn-wise’ understood
in terms of van Inwagen’s account and mutatis mutandis for ‘there are
simples arranged water-molecule-wise’, ‘there are simples arranged cat-
wise’ and so on. So Tallant has not shown that van Inwagen and the nihi-
list cannot use the former’s definition of the form ‘there are simples
arranged F-wise’ to meet the obligations they incur.10
8 But the justification for this claim is just Kripke’s contention that the modal state-
ment ‘there could not have been unicorns’ is true. Kripke does not suggest that belief
about unicorns is problematic.
9 Of course, the Kripkean owes an account of what this comes to, and, in general, the
Kripkean must speak to the phenomenon of sincere assent to sentences whose subject
terms are empty proper names/natural kind terms and the meaning of belief ascrip-
tions the that-clauses of which contain names/natural kind terms known by the ascri-
bers to be empty.
10 Brenner (2015: 12-13) also challenges Tallant’s criticism. There must be something
wrong with it, he says, since it proves too much, for example that there could be nei-
ther unicorn drawings nor particles arranged unicorn-drawing-wise. But he does not
note the crucial role of belief in van Inwagen’s definition, though he goes on to say
that someone convinced by Tallant’s criticism of van Inwagen might offer, as one of
several possibilities, an alternative definition of ‘the xs are arranged F-wise’ using the
notion of belief.
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In the following section, Tallant changes tack. He argues that even
if the nihilist and near-nihilist can give a satisfactory account of the
locutions of the form ‘the xs are arranged F-wise’ to which they must
ascribe sense (some account other than the ones he has refuted),
they cannot give such an account without ‘undermining’ the motiva-
tion they have for their restricted ontologies.
Specifically, he considers what he refers to as an ‘argument from
elimination’ (which purports to eliminate every answer to the SCQ
except nihilism [and near-nihilism]) which can, he says, be easily con-
structed from van Inwagen’s writings and claims that this reasoning
applies to it. This argument from elimination is not van Inwagen’s
explicit argument for his near-nihilism, he says. It is rather the same
in structure as an argument of Markosian’s (2014: foonote 8). But it
is not Markosian’s argument either since it has a different conclusion.
So the crucial question to be asked about Tallant’s criticism of his
constructed argument from elimination – since it is not identified
with any argument actually given by any actual nihilist or near-nihilist
– is whether it undermines the actual motivation any actual nihilist or
near-nihilist has for his position. And, in particular, most saliently,
whether it undermines the motivation van Inwagen’s explicit argu-
ment for his near-nihilism gives him. If not, the criticism of the con-
structed argument is pointless.
According to Tallant the argument from elimination for nihilism
which he constructs from van Inwagen’s writings can be undermined
as follows:
. . . if we require that for every case of composition, there is a para-
phrase that can be given in terms of the xs being arranged F-wise,
then contra the argument from elimination, we do have a para-
phrase that will suffice to describe all the cases in which composi-
tion occurs. After all, for every putatively true sentence about the xs
composing an F, there is a paraphrase to be given in terms of the
xs being arranged F-wise. There is, thus, a 1:1 match between cases
in which we think of as composition occurring and cases that our
paraphrase describes as ones in which the x’s are arranged F-wise.
Given the presence of such a match, why not treat the latter as an
answer to the SCQ? Certainly this would give us a putative answer
to the SCQ that is neither too liberal nor too conservative. It will
be just right. . . . If the answer to the SAQ delivers these results – a
true sentence in all and only cases where we intuit it to be true that
there are composite objects – then we have a resource that would
seem to give us truth-conditions for all of our putatively true sen-
tences of English about composite objects. This it seems is just a
way of answering the SCQ. (2014: 1521)
Now van Inwagen does indeed say, as we have seen, that whenever
we (the folk) intuit it to be true that there are complex objects of
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some kind, that is, assent to the claim that there are such complex
objects, there is a sentence which is true by his own lights of the form
‘there are things arranged F-wise’ which expresses what he and the
folk both believe. That is emphatically part of his position and it is
what Tallant appears to be arguing to be the case. But how this allows
us to reject the argument van Inwagen actually gives earlier in his text
against the existence of complex (non–living) things is difficult to dis-
cern.11 Tallant does not go into the details of van Inwagen’s argu-
ment, nor how the considerations he emphasises undermine it. But if
we fill in some of its details this looks implausible.
Van Inwagen argues that there are no tables because there cannot
be. There cannot be because tables exist only if they have been made.
And to be made they must be made out of smaller things. But noth-
ing we can do, by bringing together and arranging smaller things,
can suffice to make a table. For otherwise by combining other things
in the same way we could bring into existence complex objects which
clearly could not be brought into existence in this way. So, for exam-
ple, if one way to make a table were simply to bring various smaller
things into contact one could bring a new object into existence just
by getting two people to shake hands, which one clearly cannot do.
Similarly, if one could bring a table into existence by tying together
smaller things in an appropriate way one could also create a complex
object by tying two people together, but, again, clearly one cannot.
Van Inwagen runs through various possibilities and concludes that
there is nothing one could do that would bring a table into existence.
For however one arranged and bonded together smaller things in the
attempt to make a table one could so arrange and bond together peo-
ple or other living things. But doing so could not bring a complex
object into existence, ‘it is pretty clear that one cannot bring a com-
posite object into existence by bonding . . . human beings – or other
living things of any sort – to each other. . . Try to imagine bringing
something into existence by gluing hamsters or snakes together’
(1990: 62 and endnote 21). So he concludes that there is nothing
one could do that would create a table. So tables do not exist because
they could not exist. And if so nor do any other complex non–living
things. (Van Inwagen has a subsidiary argument for the existence of
complex living things.)
11 Perhaps the thought is something like: If ‘there are tables’, as we ordinarily use it, is
explained to mean ‘there are objects arranged table-wise’ then since the latter is true
so is the former. Of course. But there is no warrant to assume that ‘there are tables’
so explained contains singular existential quantification over objects that are tables,
which is what van Inwagen denies. Anything can be introduced by abbreviate defini-
tion, but we cannot define objects into existence. This, of course, is the burden of
van Inwagen’s discussion of the views of the fictitious Ginet (1993: 6-12). So if this
thought is indeed in Tallant’s discussion it has been anticipated and refuted by van
Inwagen.
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Now the argument briefly sketched here is van Inwagen’s explicit
argument for his near-nihilism.12 And it is utterly unclear how it is sup-
posed to be undermined by his introducing talk of things being
arranged F-wise when distinguishing himself from the madman. Clearly
it does not occur to van Inwagen that it might be so undermined. To
undermine van Inwagen’s argument one would have to find fault with
one of the premises or one of the steps. But Tallant does not go into
details to explain how this might be done.13 Of course not, since he is
not discussing van Inwagen’s explicit argument. But then, as noted, his
discussion of his constructed argument provides no reason to object to
van Inwagen’s argument, nor for that matter, to reject any actual argu-
ment actual nihilists have put forward for their position.
This is not to say that van Inwagen’s argument cannot be challenged.
One might query his conviction that nothing one could do to living
things could bring into existence a complex non–living object composed
of them, for example. But Tallant does not raise this query and does
not engage at all with the details of van Inwagen’s argument. So what-
ever is true of the ‘argument from elimination’ he constructs from van
Inwagen’s writings, van Inwagen’s actual argument appears unscathed.
Another challenge to van Inwagen that someone could raise is for
him to identify the proposition he expresses when he says that there
are no tables. Clearly, it is not the proposition that there are no sim-
ples which are tables because that is too obvious to need saying. Nor,
for the same reason, is it the proposition that there are no living things
which are tables. But then it is difficult to identify the proposition, of
the many consistent with what is said by the man in the street when he
says such things as that there are several antique tables in the next
room, that van Inwagen expresses when he says that there are no
tables. But however one might reply to this apparent difficulty,14 it is
12 I have not spelled out all the details. There are two crucial assumptions, in particular,
‘whether certain things compose a larger object does not depend on anything besides
the spatial and causal relations they bear to one another’ (1990: 12), and that if you
can make an artefact out of inanimate components of a certain kind you can make an
artefact of the same kind out of animate components, or inanimate components of
any other kind so long as they are capable of performing the right functional job. Van
Inwagen expresses this second thought in a rhetorical question ‘If the operation fas-
tening has the power to turn inanimate objects into the parts of a whole, why doesn’t
it have the same power with respect to living organisms?’ (1990: 68)
13 The argument sketched here is not the only consideration van Inwagen brings for-
ward in support of his near-nihilism. He has, in particular, some pointed questions
to put to his opponents (1990: 36). Of course, to defend the claim that Tallant’s crit-
icism of his constructed argument undermines the motivation van Inwagen’s own
case for his near-nihilism provides him with it would be necessary to show that these
further considerations are also undermined.
14 Perhaps van Inwagen can just say that the proposition is the denial of the proposition his
opponents mistakenly think the man in the street expresses when he says ‘there are tables’.
They know what it is. But why should we think that there is a strict philosophical claim that
goes beyond the claim ordinary folk make when they assert perfectly truly and accurately
that there are (complex objects that are) tables? The issue clearly needs further exploration.
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clear that it is not involved in Tallant’s criticism of his constructed
argument from elimination. The present difficulty, if there is one,
relates to the content of van Inwagen’s belief that there are no tables,
not to what meaning he can give to the statement that there are sim-
ples arranged table-wise, given that he believes that there are no tables.
I conclude that nihilists and near-nihilists have no obligation to
answer the SAQ since there is no such question to recognise and that
the questions that they are obliged to answer they can answer and
can do so without undermining the motivations they have for their
positions. Or at least, we have not yet been given reason to think
otherwise, certainly not by Tallant, nor as far as I am aware by anyone
else.
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